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ing after the adventure during this period. Plaintiff also relies upon
some statements deceased is supposed to have made in regard to com-
pensating him for his efforts. However the facts seem to tell a differ-
ent story-the claimant did not devote his whole time to the enterprise
after deceased left, but merely hired others to do the work; the claim-
ant did not press his claim during the lifetime of deceased who lived
about six years after the closing of the sale and made no claim until
the sale was consummated. At that time he wrote deceased a letter to
the effect that due to the fact that deceased sold the property; the
plaintiff was prevented from selling at a higher price; that if allowed
to sell it, the plaintiff would have been able to get $50,000 more than
deceased received, and plaintiff's share would have been increased $25,-
000. He asked that in view of this fact and the faithful service he has
performed, the deceased should pay him the $25,000 as a fair settle-
ment.
Outside of thpse mere conjectures that deceased ought to pay, there
does not appear to be any reference made to an agreement to pay.
The court in a concise opinion points out that the relation of joint
adventurers, as to their obligation and right, are practically the same
as those of partners. Barry v. Kern, 184 W. 266, 199 N.W. 77; Rein-
iget al v. Nelson, 199 W. W. 482, 227 N.W. 14. In the absence of
special agreement to the contrary, a partner is not entitled to compen-
sation for services rendered in conducting the partnership affairs, no
matter how much more time he may have given than the other or how
much more valuable and effective his service may have been. This is
the rule by common law and by statute. Section 123.15 (6) Stats. This
same rule is true as between joint adventurers, 33 Corpus Juris p 860.
Plaintiff contends that the existence of an agreement for compensation
may be implied from the circumstances as well as proved by direct and
positive testimony. To this the court answers that even if this were
true, the circumstances must show that such agreement was actually
made.
From this case it may be gathered that a joint adventure will be
treated very much like a partnershil and that in order that joint ad-
venturer be entitled to compensation for services rendered in conduct-
ing the joint adventure, there must be a special agreement to that
effect clearly proven by direct testimony and that one will not be in-
juret Ifrom mere circumstantial evidence.
THADDEUS WASIELEWSKI.
IMUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-NECESSARY PARTIES-TAXPAYERS SUIT.
In Coyle vs. Richter, 234 N.W. 906, officers of the city of Chippewa
Falls entered into a contract with Holtz Bros. Elect. Co. for installing
NOTES AND COMMENT
a traffic control system of stop and go lights. This contract was made
aid let on Nov. 1, 1928; without submission to bids. After the work
had been completed, a taxpayer's action to restrain payment under the
contract w'as successful. The city then advertised for bids for a new
system of stop and go lights. The city officers failed to comply with
62.15 (7) of the statutes which provides that where a patented article
or process is used in constructing a public work, the use of that article
or process shall by agreement, be available to any contractor for a rea-
sonable amount. The use of a patented device was necessary in this
contract.
After work was completed and payment was made to the contractor,
plaintiff commenced this action to compel the defendant city officers to
pay into the city treasury the sum paid out on the illegal contract. The
case was tried without making the city a party defendant. In its find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found that since the
city was not made a party to the action no judgment could be recovered
for the city against the defendants.
After holding that "the taxpayer had a good cause of action and that
such actions are of a beneficial character, the Supreme Court laid down
that there was a defect of parties. Upon the refusal of the city officers
to join the city as plaintiff, the city should have been made a party de-
fendant and when the court became aware of the defect it should
have ordered, upon its own motion, the city to become a party to the
action.
The court in its opinion relies upon the case of The Land Log, and
Lumber Co. vs. McIntyre, 100 Wis. 245, in which Justice Marshall
said, "the action belongs to the corporation (speaking of the county)
but is enforceable at the suit of its members. Illegal acts of its
corporate officers whereby its property is misapplied, squandered or
lost are not injuries to the separate interests of its stockholders and
members, that can be reached and remedied in a direct action by them."
Pomeroy in his "Equity Jurisdiction" (4th edition, 1095) says that a
city is a necessary party "in order that relief, when granted, may be
awarded to it." Other reasons cited for the ruling of the court are:
that the city's rights cannot be saved if not made a party and that
the court would become the arbitrator of the city affairs if the dispute
were only between the taxpayer and the city official.
Many states have, however, decided to the contrary while others
have statutes eliminating the city as a necessary party.
In Moore vs. Held, 73 Ia. 538, 35 N.W. 623, there was an action
to compel a city official to return money illegally paid on a contract for
the purchase of land, which contract was not properly authorized.
Held: that a town not being made a party to the proceeding, could
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not be divested of the property, nor could the official be required to
refund the money wthout a valid reconveyarice of the land. Nebraska
adopted the same rule in Shepard vs. Easterling, 61 Neb. 882, 86 N.W.
941 where the court said "a taxpayer may commence and prosecute to
judgment an action to enforce for benefit for the municipal or public
corporation, a right of action which its governing body has refused
to enforce. In such case the corporation should be made a party
defendant."
Section 260.19 (1) of the Statutes states that "the court may deter-
mine any controversy between the parties before it where it can be
done without prejudice to the rights of others or by saving their rights;
but when a complete determination of the controversy cannot be had
without the presence of other parties or any persons have such interest
in the subject matter of the controversy as requires them to be made
parties for their due protection, the court shall order them to be
brought in * * *" The theory, then, is that the interest of a corporate
member is not that of the municipality although that member has an
enforceable interest. The municipal corporation 'represents the interest
of the entire group and since the interest of the entire group is being
determined it is essential that the municipality be a party to the action.
MATHIAS J. STICH.
SURVIVAL OF TORT ACTIONS IN WISCONSIN IN RELATION TO REAL
PROPERTY. The recent case of Zartner v. Holzhauer, 234 N.W. 508,
has served to call attention to the uncertain status of the survival of
tort actions in Wisconsin, especially in those concerning real proprety.
At common law tort actions did not survive, although property
rights were incidentally affected,' but early in its history Wisconsin
began to recognize the hardship of this situation and has constantly
liberalized the right of maintaining such actions. The statutory rights,
however, must be strictly construed 2 in view of their being derogatory
of the common law.
The controlling statute on what actions survive is now section
331.01 which provides:
In addition to the actions which survive at common law the follow-
ing shall also survive: Actions for the recovery of personal property
or the unlawful withholding or conversion thereof, for the recovery of
the possession of real estate and for the unlawful withholding of the
possession thereof,3 for assault and battery, false imprisonment or
1 1 R.C.L. 25; John V. Farwell Co. v. Wolf, 96 'Wis. 10.
2 Woodward v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 23 Wis. 400.
2 Added by Chapter 56 of the Laws of 1917.
